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Abstract 
We outline a modified version of behaviour change called nudge 
plus, which incorporates an element of reflection as part of the 
delivery of a nudge. Nudge plus builds on recent work advocating 
educative nudges and boosts. Its argument turns on seminal work on 
dual systems that presents a more subtle relationship between fast 
and slow thinking than is commonly assumed in the classic literature 
in behavioural public policy. Our claim is that a hybrid nudge-think 
strategy can be a useful additional way to design pro-social 
interventions. We review classic and recent work on dual systems to 
show that a hybrid dual process account is more plausible than the 
default interventionist or parallel competitive framework. We put 
forward a way to operationalise nudge plus and set out what 
reflection could embody. We compare nudge, nudge plus, and boost, 
and draw testable implications.  
Key Words, nudge; boost; nudge plus; dual process theory 
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A nudge that incorporates an element of reflection might first seem to be a contradiction 
in terms. After all, the whole point of a nudge is that it happens automatically without 
much conscious thought on the part of the individual. The acknowledgement of the low 
cognitive capacity of individuals to make fully rational choices is thought to be one of 
the key advantages of a nudge over other policy instruments, such as information 
campaigns, laws, or taxes (Thaler and Sunstein 2009). Nudge is supposed to work on 
fast and automatic system 1 processes in a way that leaves the slow and reflective 
system 2 unengaged. Thaler and Sunstein have been at pains to stress that individuals 
could reflect and agree with a nudge after the event rather than before or during it, hence 
their commitment to publicity (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, 244). Moreover, Sunstein 
reports survey evidence that suggests that citizens approve of nudges being done to 
them of which they might not be fully aware (Sunstein 2016b, 140–41).  
 Nonetheless, a modified account of behaviour change is starting to emerge in a 
number of recent contributions, which make the claim that a nudge might work better 
and more legitimately if it incorporated an element of self-awareness and internal 
deliberation. In particular, a nudge based on some degree of reflection might be more 
capable of generating long-term, persistent, and sustainable behavioural changes than 
classic nudges can achieve alone. For example, Mühlböck et al. (2019) show that 
adding a reflective survey before a classic information nudge increases the uptake of 
the information nudge and reduces the unemployment period among Austrian youth. 
Recipients of a nudge welcome sequential additions of reflective strategies. 
It may already be the case that many existing nudges already have an element 
of self-reflection already built into their delivery, which could be acknowledged and 
enhanced. A commitment device, for example, are based on the idea that a pre-
commitment default keeps people to a desired course of behaviour; yet ensuring an 
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individual has some autonomy and reflection to think through the nature of what is 
involved, which precedes the signature of the commitment contract (Stutzer, Goette, 
and Zehnder 2011). The concern with reflection also appears in Sunstein’s advocacy of 
educative nudges and his contrast between system 1 and system 2 nudges (Sunstein 
2016a). Some classic nudges can be made to work better by simultaneously bundling 
them with reflective elements to make them more salient to the receiver, such as over-
willingness to pay for flood risk insurance (Bradt 2019), encouraging job seekers to 
think more slowly (Heller et al. 2017), and training for self-investment of Liberian 
youth (Blattman, Jamison, and Sheridan 2017). The idea that the conscious brain may 
be engaged with nudges appears in the recent debate about whether being aware of a 
nudge affects its efficacy, with an answer from the lab that it does not (Loewenstein et 
al. 2015).  
To move the debate forward, John and Stoker set out a new concept called 
‘nudge plus’, which adapts their earlier contrast between nudge and the deliberative 
‘think’ (John 2018; John and Stoker 2019). Nudge plus refers to interventions that 
might have both nudge and think incorporated into them. A nudge plus can have a 
simple modification, such as a reflection tool as part of the opt-out default, that stresses 
the salience of the agent. The agent receiving a default combined with a plus would 
switch from thinking fast to thinking slow in a way that would help responding to the 
classic nudge. The combination of the classic nudge with a reflective plus is nudge plus. 
However, nudge plus requires careful justification. It must rest on a coherent 
and defensible account of cognition that also makes sense in terms of behavioural 
public policy to ensure it is operationalizable. It is essential to understand how both 
nudge and nudge plus relate to the dual process models as advanced by Stanovich and 
West (2000), then taken up by Kahneman (2012) and Thaler and Sunstein (2009). 
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Crucially, it is important to defend, using theory and recent research in psychology, 
how system 1 and 2 processes can be in play at the same time. Moreover, it is not clear 
how nudge plus works best when applied; in particular is the nudge and plus combined 
into the same intervention, or whether the plus precedes the nudge or vice versa? Would 
it be best, as Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff (2017) argue, to boost individual capacity for 
decision-making? All these questions need to be resolved when setting out a research 
agenda for behavioural public policy incorporating reflection, so it coheres as a research 
and policy programme. This is what this paper sets out to do. 
To outline a modified version of behaviour change, this paper proceeds first by 
defining its terms and reviewing the core literatures¾that of classic nudge and boost. 
The key part of the paper is a review of the literature from cognitive science that 
supports the engagement of the two systems and questions the idea that human decision 
and action can be explained solely by a singular type of brain processes as the default. 
A more practical part of the paper offers clarity on what reflection means and its 
purpose. It then moves on to discuss the sequence of nudges and reflective exercises. 
We use these insights to compare nudge, nudge plus, and boost across common 
dimensions; then set out some testable propositions. We conclude by making some 
claims about the future of nudge plus relative to other behavioural tools. 
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Classic nudges 
As set out by Thaler and Sunstein (2009), nudges are low cost signals or procedures 
that encourage, from the planner’s point of view, a socially desirable change in 
behaviour in ways the preserve the autonomy of the individual without restricting the 
choice set. They draw on about twenty-five years of research in behavioural economics 
that locates the origins of human behaviour in psychological process and modifies a 
simple rational-cost calculation through the prism of the heuristics and biases (see also 
Sunstein and Thaler 2003).  
Their definition of nudge, much cited, is this: ‘nudge, as we will use the term, 
is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behaviour in a predictable 
way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. 
Nudges are not mandates. Putting fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk 
food does not.’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, 6). Examples of nudges include pension 
defaults, organ donation forced choices, and commitment devices for diet. They require 
changing the choice architecture of rules and procedures that, in part, governments and 
other agencies control from their command of bureaucratic and legal processes that 
affect choices of citizens. Although there is a considerable debate about the definition 
of a nudge (see Baldwin 2014; Oliver 2017), we refer to an instrument involving 
‘changes in choice architecture’ only. Information and labelling fall beyond the purview 
of the classic nudge. 
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Boost 
A boost is a class of behavioural policies that seek to improve the decision-making 
power or competence of an agent. It is different from the other behavioural instruments 
as it is directed to increase cognitive capacity only. As Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff put 
it, the goal of boosts is to ‘improve people’s competence to make their own choices and 
to make it easier for people to exercise their own agency by fostering existing 
competences or instilling new ones’ (2017, 2). A boost is based on an alternative 
psychological theory to reason why humans depart from fully rational behaviour and 
show how to improve their decision-making process by upgrading their ‘repertoire of 
decision-making skills’ (the adaptive toolbox). A boost goes beyond regular schooling 
mechanisms. A good example of a boost is an uncertainty management rule to interpret 
advice given to health patients as to how to make good choices, such as over treatments 
that might vary in the likely outcomes. People find it very hard to understand these 
probabilities, as Kahneman and Tversky (1982) found in their experiments. With some 
training, individual capacity can be increased to make better decisions.  
Rather than being just another device to improve rationality, a boost is based on 
a different assessment of cognition than nudges: people are intuitive and frugal in their 
use of the minds, and that interventions need to be targeted to make best use of the 
common sense that people have innately. With a bit of guidance, people can be taught 
to be Bayesians, for example. The boost works within the prism of the simple heuristics 
approach as agents, given their cognitive burden, choose shortcuts which are often 
cognitively beneficial but could go wrong at times. However, such biases are not 
systematic and certainly not always tied to the heuristics. Instead of getting rid of all 
heuristics, this approach believes in making such heuristics smarter and intuitive to 
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avoid those occasional mistakes. Heuristics work best when the agent’s cognitive 
skillset and the external environment work in tandem. 
The boost, however, assumes that agents have the motivation and competence 
to benefit from the improved decision-making processes resulting from the boosting 
mechanism. This is different to the classic nudge which assumes a ‘somewhat mindless, 
passive decision maker’ (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, 36). A boost assumes that by 
changing the environment, or their cognitive skills and abilities (competency), an agent 
will make better decisions (Grüne-Yanoff and Hertwig 2016). Different variants of 
these boosts have been tested in varied settings; for instance, literacy skills have been 
shown to improve financial decision making (Drexler, Fischer, and Schoar 2014), and 
quick dietary rules have helped people make more healthy food choices (Pollan 2010). 
 
Nudge plus 
One critique made by researchers outside behavioural economics is that nudges can 
only deal with relatively minor public problems and ones that are strictly under the 
guidance of the benevolent policy-maker, using techniques of behavioural science (e.g. 
Mols et al. 2015; Marteau et al. 2011). The size of the challenge achieving sustainable 
behaviour change requires a more profound and long-lasting solution that builds on the 
consent of individuals. There also needs to be a way to address the criticism that nudges 
manipulate so reduce autonomy of individuals or even bypass their explicit consent, 
even from within a libertarian paternalist framework (Bovens 2008). These objections 
to nudge are addressed in an alternative programme of ‘think’ that implies that debate 
and deliberation can help individuals achieve their objectives and tested in a series of 
interventions (John et al. 2013; 2019). But thinks are hard to scale up to the general 
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population; they involve much time and strong commitment from individuals that they 
may not wish to give. To be closer to the classic nudge, John and Stoker (John and 
Stoker 2019) set out a modified version of nudge¾nudge plus¾that incorporates an 
element of reflection, yet might be cognitively easy for an agent to uptake.  
Nudge plus takes a different approach to cognition. While a classic nudge takes 
advantage of the biases of system 1 processes by co-opting it (internal architecture) and 
changing the external environment (choice architecture), a nudge plus builds on it by 
adding reflective strategies to the nudge. The reflective strategy, the plus, offers to 
extend the autonomy of the agent. Nudge plus can be thought to lie on a continuum of 
agency autonomy, with the left of the spectrum (no autonomy) being occupied by 
classic nudges and the right (complete autonomy) as pure reflective strategies. Nudge 
plus can be potentially more liberty preserving and transparent than the classic nudge.  
What might a simple nudge plus look like? Building on the classic opt-out 
defaults, it might be easy to think of nudge plus as an opt-out default, say a duplex 
printing set-up, combined with a self-reflective commitment nudge that leads the agents 
into thinking about the purpose of their print and choosing the correct format thereafter. 
Similarly, a naïve thought experiment might indicate that, for instance, people who see 
fruit instead of chocolate near the checkout tills in a cafeteria, the classic Thaler and 
Sunstein nudge, might wish to have a chance to reflect on why is the fruit placed there 
as addiction to sugar will not cause them to substitute the fruit without some kind of 
thought (John 2018, 129). The prompt could be a debate about climate change with the 
cashier, or some kind of exercise that happens while customers are waiting, such as a 
push button survey, or if the customer had previously learnt of the NHS ‘five-portion-
a-day’ rule. The plus could also happen before the nudge, such as at the start of the 
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queue, or even afterwards to encourage consistent consumption of the fruit on later 
occasions. 
Practical as these examples appear, they involve a shift in the model of cognition 
assumed to be in operation when people are making choices. To resolve this issue, we 
present evidence from the cognitive psychology literature that justifies that a hybrid 
nudge-think framework as reasonable. The approach needs to be situated within a 
defensible account of dual system theory. The upcoming section will give a brief 
overview of the different dual process theories. We define what reflection actually 
means, what it aims to achieve and how could such a nudge plus be operationalised 
before providing a clearer exposition into the conceptual differences between the 
different accounts of behaviour change. 
 
Dual process theories: an overview 
Canonical work in social cognitive psychology bifurcate cognitive processes into two 
different kinds, laying the foundational stone of what later came to be broadly known 
as the dual process theories. Dual process theories posit that, ‘there are two distinct 
processing models available for cognitive tasks: one (type 1) that is fast, automatic and 
non-conscious, and another (type 2) that is slow, controlled and conscious’ (Frankish 
2010, 914). These theories date back to the 1960s and have been evolving ever since. 
Although different schools of thoughts have emerged within the domain of the dual 
process theories, the central emphasis has been on the idea that cognitive processes can 
be clearly distinguished into an intuitive (or, heuristic) and analytical (or, systematic 
rule-based) type that might interact with one another, and take precedence over each 
other depending on the nature of the task. These theories came to existence 
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independently until an attempt was made to combine them into a more structured and 
generalised framework based on the common traits of these models (for a summary, 
see Gawronski and Creighton 2013, chapter 14).  
A central tenet of these dual process theories is the clear distinction between the 
two types of brain processes. Frederick and Kahneman (2002) show how the cognitive 
processes labelled as system 1 and system 2 were popularly used following Stanovich 
(1999) and Stanovich and West (2000), then later popularised by Kahneman (2012) in 
his book Thinking, Fast and Slow. These systems have a set of characteristics: the more 
reflexive system 1 is usually thought to be automatic, effortless, associative, rapid, and 
parallel, and is often contextualised as the old mind whereas the reflective type system 
2 is often summoned as the controlled, effortful, reasonable, lazy, and rule based. 
However, the labels given to the two class of processes are possibly misleading and 
imply two distinct types of cognitive processes interconnected by neurological traits 
only (for details, see Lieberman 2003).1 Next we discuss the interplay between the two 
types of cognitive processes and the main critiques of dual process theories in recent 
scholarly literature.  
 
Critiques of dual process accounts 
Dual process models drew criticism from a range of social cognitive psychologists; 
ones that proposed a single, malleable and unified brain processes (Osman 2004; 
Kruglanski and Gigerenzer 2011) to ones that posited multiple processes models 
(Sherman 2006). While these dual processes were characterised by multiple traits, they 
 
1 Note that system 1 and 2 processes are interchangeably used with type 1 and 2 
processes. 
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suffered conjointly from a clustering problem i.e. most of these traits failed to co-occur 
with the processes involved; for instance, as Bargh (1994) posited in his four horsemen 
of automaticity theory, the processes could be explained on basis on four attributes: 
awareness, intention, efficiency, and cognitive control. However, as it turned out, none 
of these were always concurrent in any type of cognitive processing involved; for 
instance, a process that was fast and inattentive turned out to be cognitively 
controllable, thereby failing to satisfy the label of being truly reflexive in nature.  
More recently, Evans and Stanovich (2013) seek to resolve the debate by 
positing that the two set of processes share multiple features but they are not all 
defining. They put forward a necessary and sufficient condition for each of the two dual 
processes: Type 1 processes must have ‘autonomy’ and type 2 processes must satisfy 
‘cognitive decoupling
’
 for hypothetical thinking. However, assertions regarding the 
existence of one, two, or multiple processes are ontological in nature. As Gawronski 
and Creighton put it, ‘we cannot test empirically if there are one, two or multiple 
processes. Researchers can make decisions about the usefulness of ontological claims 
by empirically testing assumptions about the proposed processes.  
Dual process theories have fared very well and have a dominant role in social 
psychology (Gawronski and Creighton 2013, 307–8). However, there is still some 
disagreement over how the systems operate together (Zimmerman 2016). In line with 
recent neuroscientific evidence in social cognitive psychology, the two sets of 
neurological processes are interconnected by a common defining characteristic. In 
simpler terms, the brain has two types of processes, one that is autonomous and other 
that can think, and every action-decision pair is a result of these processes, which might 
either work simultaneously or sequentially. 
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The interplay of cognitive processes 
A key issue is how these brain processes interact with one another. Does one take 
precedence over the other? Can both the processes occur concurrently? Can one type 
be put off while the other works? To resolve this conflict amongst the dual processes, 
Evans (2007) put forward a simple additively separable model of decision making 
under uncertainty. In this analysis, borrowing from Evans, it is possible to simplify the 
story with Kahneman’s characters (slightly renamed): Bob/Bobbie (type 1) and 
Joe/Joanna (type 2). For brevity, let’s assume Bobbie is the autonomous character, acts 
on her free will and is quick to answer things; while Joanna is capable of cognitive 
reasoning and decoupling. 
Let us further assume that Bobbie and Joanna have participated in a pub quiz as 
a team. Bobbie and Joanna will get a minute to answer, and there are four thematic 
rounds. Bobbie and Joanna are both normatively rational.2 How do they decide on their 
answers as a team? There could be two possibilities: either Bobbie and Joanna split the 
themes on the basis of their thematic expertise such that whoever fits the bill answers 
the question in that round, or both of them decide to answer in all the rounds. If the 
latter holds, they might have to write their individual answers on a chit and then cross 
check before reaching a conclusion. Let us suppose Bobbie and Joanna choose the 
former. This is what Evans (2007) classifies as the pre-emptive conflict resolution dual 
process models and resonates with the dual process theory put forward by Klaczynski 
(2000) and the selective scrutiny model of belief bias (Anonimo et al. 1993).   
 
2
 A common fallacy of dual process theories is the presumption that only Joanna is 
normative and rational (for discussion, see J. Evans 2007; and J. Evans and Stanovich 
2013, 7). 
 
 14 
What happens if Bobbie and Joanna walk down the other path, and decide to 
answer collectively in all thematic rounds? There are two possibilities again; either, 
Bobbie and Joanna end up writing the same answer and there is no conflict, or, they 
write different answers and end up with a conflict. If both write the same answer, the 
solution is trivially the same. However, in case of a conflict, they must find a way to 
resolve the conflict together. Evans (2007) proposes a probabilistic solution to this: both 
Bobbie and Joanna try first, and one’s opinion will be heard and finally settled upon 
after a verbal duel between the two. This is referred to as the parallel-competitive model 
of dual process theory. Contrarily, one might always dominate the other in case of a 
conflict as if Joanna wins a verbal duel whenever there is one. This conflict resolution 
model is referred to as the default-interventionist model of dual process theory. In this 
case, both Joanna and Bobbie can dominate one another (see A-dominating or C-
dominating process dissociation model by Jacoby and Lindsay (1994) and Jacoby 
(1991) respectively). However, the classic default-interventionist models (J. Evans 
2010; Kahneman 2012; J. Evans and Stanovich 2013) assume a pertinently corrective 
role for Joanna at all times i.e. the system 2 processes will override system 1 processes 
if there is a conflict detected.  
 
Dual processes: simultaneous or sequential? 
Even within the class of dual process theories, there can be a subcategorization 
depending on the type of the response mechanism involved. Although there are 
different interaction mechanisms of the dual processes, does one suit the role better than 
the other? This remained an ontological concern for a long time until recently, and ‘all 
three models enjoy[ed] implicit support from dual process theorist’ (Evans, p10, 2007); 
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for instance, Epstein’s cognitive-experiential self-theory (1994) presume that the two 
types of processes (called systems incoherently) might occur in parallel, while 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002, 51) endorse a default-interventionist structure as they 
wrote, ‘we assume, system 1 quickly proposes intuitive answers to judgment problems 
as they arise, and system 2 monitors the quality of these proposals, which it may 
endorse, correct or override’.  
A common argument in favour of the default-interventionist mechanism has 
been that type 1 processes are fast and automatic, while type 2 processes are slower and 
rule-based. If they have to operate in parallel, why would the faster type 1 process wait 
for the slower type 2 processes. This has been countered in various ways in the 
literature; we will put forward two major arguments for this. First, these processes share 
common characteristics but not all of them might be defining and co-occur. What is 
being perceived as slow, rule-based and reasoning might also favour heuristics, and 
lead to anomalies. Second is an analogy that we borrow from Paap, Noel, and Johnson 
(1992) and noted by Evans (2007, 12, fn 4): it posits that in a horse race, but it is not 
always the fastest horse that wins. In a very similar fashion, the dual processes can run 
in parallel without Bobbie always ending up with an answer before Joanna.  
However, DeNeys (2012; 2014; 2019) has suggested a hybrid dual process 
theory. It overcomes the shortcomings of the prior generic processing architectures that 
guide the interplay of the two cognitive processes. In explaining this hybrid model, 
Gronchi and Giovanelli (2018, 2) posit that a ‘shallow analytic monitoring process is 
always active to detect potential conflicts between the two systems, and an optional 
deeper processing stage is activated once an actual conflict between fast and slow 
thinking is found’. To facilitate this hybrid cognitive architecture, DeNeys is suggestive 
of two types of system 1 responses; one that is heuristically driven (the so-called 
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intuitive processes) and the other which is logically intuitive. According to this hybrid 
model, the two system 1 processes are activated in parallel followed by the system 2 
processes which act to validate and justify the conflict resolution put forward by the 
logically intuitive processes. In this novel attempt to bridge the gap between the default-
interventionist and the parallel competitive model, DeNeys upgrades the role of system 
1 processes; he acknowledges that system 2 processes is more of the validator than the 
corrector as has been incorrectly assumed by the prior scholarly literature on dual 
process accounts. 
This argument applies to conflict resolution models only i.e. both Bobbie and 
Joanna decide to participate in all thematic rounds of the pub quiz. There is no situation 
where one assumes a passive role and takes a backseat. This has also been the common 
theme of most psychological theorizing; as Kahneman (2012, 24) writes, ‘in the story 
that I will tell, systems 1 and 2 are both active whenever we are awake’. There is, 
however, more to cognitive processes than just following a sequential, default intuition 
and interventionist analytic structure. While parallel competitive models have garnered 
attention alongside the sequential models, a hybrid set up is yet to yield empirically 
robust results. What has been the cornerstone of most behavioural instruments was that 
they have encountered scenarios in which it was deemed suitable to endorse either the 
parallel competitive or the default-interventionist framework of the dual process 
theories. However, with evidence from the cognitive psychology literature and 
neuroscientific findings that different sections of the brain might be activated in 
response to a common stimuli, there is the possibility of proposing a device that might 
be a hybrid; one that essentially combines the two cognitive processes, and shares 
features of both the parallel competitive and default interventionist dual processes 
accounts. The upcoming section will outline the operationalisation of nudge plus before 
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comparing the different behavioural instruments, and then outline testable predictions 
before concluding. 
 
Operationalising nudge plus 
How can nudge plus be administered? Recall the pub quiz. In their team, Bobbie and 
Joanna were free to adopt different conflict resolution strategies; what was essential is 
how they, as a team, decided to resolve such conflicts. The brain as a whole, also 
functions as a team when faced with decision-making choices. Put simply, the two types 
of brain processes are functional members of this team.  
Faced with a choice and when in conflict, either Bobbie or Joanna can have a 
verbal duel and the emerging winner provides with the team’s answer; or, they could 
begin with a rule-based system where one team member remains dominant and 
validates (or, rectifies) the response generated by the other member. The former, the 
parallel competitive model, suggests that a simultaneous nudge plus can be 
administered, where in essence, the nudge and its plus are delivered such that they 
prompt both type of brain processes to act together. The latter supports a sequential 
nudge plus mechanism; where the plus precedes or follows the nudge, letting automatic 
and reflective processes to act in sequence, reinforcing each other’s effects. The plus 
can be conceived by the policy maker to be delivered before, after or as part of the 
classic nudge. 
The order in which the nudge and the plus act are, however, context relevant to 
the task (policy challenge) at hand and has implications on what the plus seeks to 
achieve as part of its delivery. While a nudge plus promises greater, if not equivalent, 
autonomy relative to classic nudges, each works differently on accounts of transparency 
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and effectiveness. Some classes of plus, for instance, may work by making the existing 
nudge more salient to the receiver and thereby increasing the effectiveness of the nudge 
only and keep transparency unchanged; other classes may work by making the nudge 
construct more transparent to the receiver. Others might allow the agent to reflect on 
their actions completely, thereby making it even more transparent. However, the change 
in effectiveness might be a priori ambiguous to the policy maker in these latter 
instances.  
A classic traffic lighting scheme, for instance, when combined and delivered 
with salience building labelling information can be classified to be a simultaneous 
nudge plus that offer greater effectiveness. While the construct of a traffic lighting 
nudge rests on the tenet that the agent is subtly reminded of red lights meaning ‘stop’, 
green lights meaning ‘go’ and amber ones meaning ‘at your own risk’, such that they 
make the healthier and safer lifestyle choices automatically; agents, with strong 
antecedent preferences or acting in weakly ecological-rational settings, might miss the 
visual cue, thereby, rendering the nudge ineffective. In these instances, adding an 
information label explicitly spelling out what the colour coding means would draw the 
agent’s attention, and lead to a greater uptake of the nudge while guaranteeing enhanced 
autonomy as the agent can selectively decide to ignore the nudge. Similarly, providing 
a choice to commit before or after a default setting could have different implications. 
A default setting is usually taken up by an agent due to the cognitive easing it comes 
with; for instance, choosing from a set-menu is often easier for an individual who 
dreads a large menu with many options. In this setting, providing the agent with the 
choice to commit to a healthier diet before the default menu is presented makes the 
uptake of the default more salient to the agent suggesting greater effectiveness. 
However, if the sequence of this nudge plus is reverted such that the set menu is 
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presented first, and just before ordering the agent is asked to commit to a healthier diet, 
the choice thereafter would be governed by self-reflection, and in essence should be 
more transparent to the agent, even though the treatment effect of the nudge plus might 
be less effective than its opaque nudge counterpart. 
Generally speaking, the role plus plays and outcomes it aims to achieve, in turn 
depends on kind of reflection that the plus seeks to deliver. Reflection as a means of 
learning has been researched quite extensively (for a review, see Atkins and Murphy 
1993). While the idea of reflection and reflective strategies is abstract at its best, two 
strands of literature can be held accountable for the promising leap in understanding 
what it means; one can be traced back to educational theorists who postulated as early 
as the 1980s, the role reflection takes on in reforming one’s own self and behaviour, a 
form of conscious or deliberate learning (Tough 1979). The other strand can be traced 
back to the dual process theorists who have, timelessly, referred to the effortful 
cognitive processes as the reflective brain processes. In the account that we aim to 
provide here, we abide by dual process view that type 2 processes are capable of 
reflection and what they lead to in the conceptualisation of nudge plus is an 
‘experiential learning’ environment, which if accepted by the receiver leads to a 
persistent effect of the classic nudge.  
Reflection, true to its origin as seeing ‘one’s reflection in the mirror’ has often 
been used to relate to self-reflection. An intellectual, for instance, is a mind that watches 
itself. However, contrary to the common belief, reflection could personify different 
meanings; for instance, one could reflect on one’s own choices, beliefs, thoughts or 
feelings, or one could reflect on the available alternatives, or even more could reflect 
on the structural assumptions behind a construct. To be precise, reflection involves 
thinking about something. However, is reflection always conscious? Reflection could 
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be conscious, for instance, when one deliberately thinks of options or unconscious when 
triggered by the environmental cues. Even more, it could be a solitary act when one 
reflects on the choices, or as part of the herd; for instance, debriefing exercises help 
reflection (Boud 1985). However, whether self or group led, conscious or unconscious, 
reflection involves transformation of perspectives: old to new. 
 However, what does this transformation entail? Different scholars have 
recognised different stages in reflection that lead to the generation of new perspectives; 
Schon (1991), for instance, identifies three different stages in reflection: think, criticize, 
and acting accordingly. Mezirow (1981; 1998) accounts for a seven-stage reflective 
process. However, as Atkins and Murphy (1993) put it, reflection involves sharing an 
initial discomfort/dissonance from a certain stimuli, followed by critical analysis of 
one’s feelings and thereafter acting in accordance to them. This critical reflection could 
either come as a sudden shock, for instance, a heart disorder can cause reflective 
processes to be activated leading to a change in lifestyle; or, it can come in transition, 
for instance, borderline changes in blood sugar levels can make someone conscious of 
their lifestyle habits and introduce small lifestyle changes. However, one must be 
motivated, conscientious and goal-oriented to act on the cues and reflect choices. This 
distinguishes reflection from just letting thoughts emerge. Considering this, reflection 
as the plus, can be defined as follows: 
Reflection is the act of thinking and re-evaluating prior actions, 
choice constructs or available alternatives, triggered by 
conscious or unconscious experiences, that when engaged in by 
the agent results in the uptake of newer perspectives. 
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The plus, when taken up by the agent, implies self-reflection in relation to long-
term preferences, for instance, when asked to commit after a default, or a deeper 
thinking about the choice construct of the behavioural tool at hand, or where greater 
salience can lead to an enhanced uptake of the nudge or a greater transparency into the 
decision making scenario or both. Whatever might be the reflective process, the agent 
learns in the environment and behaves accordingly with a new reactance. The 
environment, in turn, is either transparency enhancing, or effectiveness enhancing, or 
both. As such, nudge plus can have an effect through both the nudge and its plus, but 
to reinforce a persistent change, the policy maker must decide on whether the plus 
comes before, after or with the nudge depending on the context in hand. Most domains 
of nudge could include a reflective component, even the default, as the dialogue 
between the policy-maker and the citizen is not a one off, but occurs over time, perhaps 
over the whole lifespan of a citizen, such as a pensions default that occurs at the start 
of someone’s career but is explained at a later stage. 
To sum up, nudge plus mixes a classic nudge with reflective strategies. 
However, given the dual process accounts that we have discussed, such combinations 
could either be simultaneous or sequential in nature; simultaneous meaning both the 
nudge and plus are administered at the same time, and sequential meaning one is 
preceded by the other in any logical order. The operationalisation of nudge plus is 
supported by cognitive dual process accounts; when the nudge plus is simultaneously 
administered it would closely resemble the account of a parallel competitive dual 
processes model, while in its application as a sequential nudge plus, it would mimic the 
default-interventionist approach.  
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Comparing nudge, nudge plus, and boost 
Now that we have set out an account of cognition, how do these understandings play 
out with the three kinds of intervention we started with, nudge, nudge plus, and boost?  
To begin with, here is a simple decision-making task to help understand how nudge, 
nudge plus, and boost might differ by their functionality. 
Consider visiting a restaurant and placing an order. This entails a simple search 
to draw information from the underlying characteristic set, consisting of agent relative 
traits and environmental factors, and use simple search rules R1 to narrow down the 
alternatives. The search rules, for instance, in this exemplar could be to look for a 
restaurant nearest to my place or one that serves a particular cuisine. The search leads 
to a set of available alternatives which then have underlying properties; for instance, 
price, quality of dish served and so on which through a series of selection rules R2 are 
then narrowed down to a final choice. Let Figure 1 represent this choice mechanistic 
scheme. Now in this given context, the behavioural instruments might work very 
differently. 
Nudges, for instance, will work by co-opting the biases of an individual and 
changing the choice construct only, indicated by path line L1, such that all other 
attributes including the set of alternatives and their properties remain unchanged. 
Boosts, on the contrary, work by improving the competencies of the agent. As such, the 
boosts will change the underlying search and selection rules, R1 and R2 only, keeping 
the choice environment and the alternatives unchanged. These changes in the rules can 
be at times driven by changes in the informational environment, those referred to by 
Herwig and Grüne-Yanoff (2017) as short-term boosts but that is not all of it. 
Furthermore, any regulatory policy would involve changing the set of alternatives or 
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its properties ideally; for instance, a ban would reduce the set of alternatives or a price 
change would change the properties set.  
Nudge plus could work differently to all of these indicated paths. This, however, 
is contingent on what role the plus plays. Consider, for instance, a plus that makes the 
nudge more salient by making the choice construct clearer. This involves path L1 but 
simultaneously draws on the environment’s informational subset as well. Similarly, 
when the plus embodies a reflection that allows the agent to reflect on the available 
alternatives, the plus involves re-evaluating the set of alternatives either before, after or 
along with the path L1. Now what happens, if one self-reflects on their actions? This 
involves drawing on the agent-relative properties, besides affecting L1.  
 
Figure 1: A mechanistic scheme3  
 
3
 This representation of a mechanistic scheme was adapted from one presented by Till 
Grune-Yanoff in a lecture on the 27 November 2019. 
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Nudge plus works by building on choice constructs of the nudges, while boosts 
and other instruments adopt a different causal pathway. These functional differences 
can, however, be explained by a range of operational parameters, to which we now turn. 
Table 1 does the job of comparing them and showing how they depend on different 
accounts of cognition. If we accept the argument of the previous section that a more 
sophisticated account of cognition is needed, then the case improves for nudge plus. 
With respect to the psychological paradigm, although both the heuristics and 
biases (H&B) and the simple heuristics (SH) approach begin with heuristics as their 
cognitive foundation, they differ in their conceptual rationale in justifying humans’ 
bounded rationality and their associated failures. While the H&B presumes that all 
biases are systematic, and that they are usually generalizable across the population in a 
way that a bias will arise when there is a heuristic that is adopted; SH, contrarily, denies 
this by acknowledging that humans follow short cuts, and they might go wrong at times, 
but this is not systematic. In doing so, the proponents of the SH approach believe that 
there remains no need to co-opt an agent’s heuristics, and that their decision making 
can be improved by simply enlarging their adaptive toolbox. Given that classic nudges 
and boosts belong to these two different psychological schools of thought, it can be 
easily anticipated that their underlying processing (cognitive) architectures will differ 
even if they lead to the same behavioural outcome.  
In line with our conceptualisation of the nudge plus, there is sufficient reason to 
believe that it is closely aligned to the H&B approach. The justification for this 
psychological theorizing of nudge plus in turn leads us on to this discussion’s second 
tenet of comparison: the cognitive architecture. Nudge plus remains as extension of the 
classic nudges and build on them by adding self-reflection strategies. In doing so, the 
nudge plus construct acknowledges the validity of the dual process accounts as because, 
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by conceptualisation, the nudge component functions by taking advantage of an agent’s 
volitional biases that co-occur with her heuristically based decisions facilitated by the 
cue-based autonomous (intuitive) responses; while the plus component induces her 
reflective processes to work which can thereafter reinforce the behavioural change 
incorporated by the nudge.  
It is important to stress that nudge plus restores the autonomy of the agent, 
which addresses the risk of the reversing the behavioural change and improves the 
transparency of instituting such changes, addressing in part some of the ethical 
objections to nudges. The agent can decide whether such changes are compatible to 
other decisions and preferences which is more likely to lead to persistent behavioural 
changes. Even though the classic nudge, through repeated applications, can also sustain 
behaviour over time, nudge plus may achieve such persistent behavioural changes even 
as a one-off application. Self-realisation of the nudge’s objective by the agents, may 
embed transformed behaviour in a new habitual pattern, sustaining it even after the 
withdrawal of the nudge plus. 
The final theme of comparison between the behavioural change seeking 
instruments: the motivation and competence of the decision-making agent. The 
problem identified with the incorrectly designed commitment device can also be 
extended to a well-designed policy whether a plus or boost. This has been well 
documented by Hertwig and Grune-Yanoff (2017) as the policy-theory coherence 
dilemma. If agents lack motivation, a boost and plus will under achieve their targets.  
In the worst possible scenario failing reflection on lacking motivation, nudge plus 
would end up delivering the same effect as a classic nudge (just the way a boost or think 
fails). Set out in this way, this creates the testable implication that an element of 
reflection as part of the delivery of the nudge will improve outcomes compared to the 
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classic nudge. We cannot adjudicate from theory between the effectiveness of nudge 
plus and boost or whether the plus or boost is better delivered before the intervention 
or during it. We can hypothesise that a nudge plus will beat a boost and the classic 
nudge when outcomes are examined over the long term and in successive interventions 
because of the self-knowledge that nudge plus entails. Nudge plus beating nudge, and 
over the long-term beating boost, are two direct testable implications we draw. 
Furthermore, the plus might also lead to promoting behavioural spill overs in other 
domains as agents learn to reflect on life-choices in general and is the third testable 
prediction. 
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Note: Columns 1 and 3 as adopted from Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff (Table 1, p16, 2016; Table 1, p2, 
2017) 
Table 1: Conceptual Underpinnings of different behavioural policies 
 
Dimension Classic nudge Nudge Plus Boost 
Psychological 
Paradigm 
Heuristics and Biases Heuristics and Biases Simple Heuristics 
Cognitive 
Architecture 
Dual Process Theory Dual Process Theory Malleable cognitive structure 
Reversibility Reversible Persistent effects Persistent effects 
Opacity Usually opaque Transparent with the plus 
element 
Completely transparent 
Autonomy No autonomy Autonomy comes with the 
plus element 
Complete autonomy 
Causal Pathway Behaviour Behaviour Competency 
Bias Awareness 
and Control 
No Awareness and 
Control 
Control given with the 
plus element 
Agent is aware and in control 
of the biases 
Social Planner’s 
information about 
end goals and 
benevolence 
Social planner is 
assumed to be 
benevolent and aware 
of end goals 
Social planner must be 
aware of end goals but 
decision is left to the 
agent. Can be rent seeking 
No need for social planner to 
be aware of the goals. Social 
planner can be rent-seeking 
Cognitive error of 
Social planner 
Must not be error 
prone 
Can be error prone Can be error prone 
Motivation and 
competence of 
decision maker 
Not required. The 
decision maker is a 
cognitive cripple 
The decision maker must 
be goal-oriented, 
conscientious and 
motivated to act. 
The decision maker must be 
competent and motivated to 
act. 
Examples Opt-out Defaults, 
Traffic Lighting 
Scheme, Commitment 
Devices, et cetera 
Nudges like Defaults or 
Traffic lighting schemes 
comibined with pluses 
like Active Decision 
Mechanisms like contracts 
or personal budgeting 
schemes or salience 
building information or 
social feedback schemes 
that can led to reflection.  
Educative Nudges, Fast and 
Frugal Trees, Quick Rules, 
Numeracy enhancing skills, 
Implementation Intentions 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to develop a modified account of behaviour change¾nudge 
plus¾based on the idea that encouraging an element of reflection as part the delivery 
of the nudge would enhance outcomes.  Nudge plus gives an opportunity for citizens to 
own the process; and thereby they commit and invest in it. A key further aim in this 
paper is to distinguish between strategies of behaviour change, and the most powerful 
way of doing it is with a plausible account of dual processes. The review of dual systems 
shows that the pure dependence on dual systems implied by classic nudge is not 
sustainable at least in all domains; there is a better case for a more plastic account of 
the two systems implied by boosts. The idea that the two systems are connected is 
support for nudge plus as it is based on a plausible account of cognition.  
Having set out the conceptual foundations, we have elaborated the potential for 
nudge plus as a form of behavioural public policy. We have set out testable claims of 
the differences between the three kinds of intervention. There remains of course more 
conceptual work to do, such as to examine the welfare implications of increasing 
autonomy with nudge plus, and to find out the extent to which individuals are still being 
manipulated even if they are encouraged to reflect as it might be clear what direction 
the reflection is supposed to lead. Also nudge plus and boosts have been presented as 
competitors as forms of intervention, but they may be complementary and work more 
strongly in tandem with each other. Even with these further theoretical challenges, the 
way forward at the moment is for more tests of nudge plus to take place.   
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